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Abstract
When addressing nuclear issues in South Asia, most 
scholars focus solely on India and Pakistan. Although 
we should acquiesce that the problematic diplomatic ties 
between Islamabad and New Delhi includes a nuclear 
dimension, facts demonstrate that China has a para-
mount role in the regional nuclear dynamics. In order to 
understand these dynamics, the article analyses the his-
torical background of the nuclear weapons programs and 
the strategic imperatives which underlined their origins. 
Subsequently it shows how they influence each other, 
constituting a trilateral nuclear dynamic with risks to 
the regional stability brought under an “action-reac-
tion” cycle.
Resumo
A Dinâmica Nuclear Trilateral no Sul da Ásia
Quando se abordam as questões nucleares no Sul 
da Ásia, a maioria dos investigadores tem a tendên-
cia para se focar somente na Índia e no Paquistão. 
Apesar de termos que reconhecer que os laços 
diplomáticos conturbados entre Islamabad e Nova 
Deli incluem uma problemática dimensão nuclear, 
factos demonstram que a China tem um papel cen-
tral nesta dinâmica nuclear regional. De forma a 
compreender as dinâmicas nucleares entre estes 
três países, o artigo começa por abordar o enqua-
dramento histórico destes programas de armas 
nucleares e os imperativos estratégicos subjacentes 
às suas origens. De seguida analisar-se-á a forma 
como estes programas se influenciam, formando 
uma dinâmica nuclear trilateral, com riscos para a 
estabilidade regional advindos deste ciclo de 
“ação-reação”.
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“I'm not afraid of nuclear war.” (Mao Zedong, 1965)
“As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the 
latest scientific devices for its protection. I hope Indian scientists will use atomic power for 
constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself 
by all means at her disposal.” (Jawaharlal Nehru, 1946, quoted in Udgaonkar, 1999: 154)
“If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one 
of our own.” (Ali Bhutto, 1965, quoted in Pillalamarri, 2015)
Most of the nuclear weapons research on Asia revolves around countries such as 
North Korea, Russia, China, India and Pakistan. Although the latent turmoil that 
persists in South Asia generally embeds the already mentioned countries of this 
subcontinent, a more insightful analysis on the regional nuclear dynamics reveals 
that it involves additional countries. This article shows that the nuclear dynamics 
in the South Asian region directly involves not only India and Pakistan but also 
China’s nuclear weapons developments.
We start by making a brief historical account on nuclear weapons developments 
made by the three countries in order to understand the origins and strategic drivers 
behind it. By adopting this historical perspective it will be possible to understand 
the impact that nuclear weapons programs had in exacerbating the already present 
regional security dilemmas. 
Subsequently the article focus on how the nuclear weapons programs – and its 
delivery platforms – of China, India and Pakistan impact each other, thus forming 
the South Asian trilateral nuclear dynamic. Finally, after addressing the “action-
reaction” cycle that characterizes this dynamic, we point out some potential nuclear 
stability risks that need to be addressed in order to prevent an increase in the 
regional instability.
Historical Background of the Trilateral Nuclear Dynamics in South Asia
China
The inception of the Chinese nuclear program can be traced to the 50’s decade 
mostly due to the 1954-55 skirmish between the United States (US) and China over 
two strategically important islands in the Taiwan Strait. Additionally, another rea-
son behind this weapons program was the Chinese leadership preoccupation 
regarding a hypothetical nuclear attack by the US at the end of the Korean War 
(Sagan, 1996: 58-59). While understanding how difficult it would be to offset the 
US nuclear forces, the Chinese President Mao Zedong, in the beginning of 1955, 
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authorized the initial development of a nuclear weapons program. As the US placed 
nuclear weapons in Taiwan and another Taiwan Strait crisis arose, the Chinese 
leadership decided to create the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research Institute (later 
known as the Ninth Academy) and build uranium enrichment facilities throughout 
the country in 1958.
Two years later, work began on the construction of a plutonium production reactor, 
at the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex, and a nuclear test site in western China. 
While the Soviet Union gave initial support for a plutonium production facility, the 
assistance was terminated in 1959 without the transfer of any sensitive technology 
(Burr and Richelson, 2000: 57-58). The ideological animosity between the Soviet 
Union and China and their border confrontations “exposed the limited value of 
China’s conventional deterrent” gave the final incentive for the Chinese develop-
ment of a nuclear arsenal (Sagan, 1996: 59; National Intelligence Estimate number 
11: 13-69). Years later, the continuing growth of the Sino-Soviet tensions led the 
communist superpower to consider a preemptive attack on the Chinese nuclear 
facilities (US State Department, 1969).
On the 16th of October 1964, China detonated its first nuclear engine based on 
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) with a 12-22 Kilotons (Kt) yield. Surprisingly, only 
three years after its first nuclear test, the Chinese authorities were able to test its 
first thermonuclear bomb with 3.3 Megatons (Mt) yield.1 Over the next three 
decades, unlike other nuclear weapons states, China’s evolution of its nuclear arse-
nal was gradual and slow which made it systematically vulnerable to opponents. 
Authors provide two different explanations for this extended vulnerability. One of 
the explanations is based on ideology. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping 
believed that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons was to prevent nuclear aggres-
sion and coercion. In order to achieve that, the nuclear arsenal would be solely 
based on the ability to retaliate an initial nuclear strike and impose unacceptable 
damage. A second explanation for the slow development of the Chinese nuclear 
arsenal lies on the political and technical restrictions that prevented the further 
improvement of these weapons and their delivery systems. 
Regardless of the reasons for the vulnerability of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, since 
its inception it had a specific trait, namely its small size and vulnerability. In 1985, 
Beijing had around 151 nuclear warheads which was about half of the French and 
the United Kingdom nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the nuclear ballistic missiles just 
had intermediate and medium range, which prevented China from reaching the 
full extent of the Soviet Union’s and the US’ territory. In terms of vulnerability, 
although nuclear capable, these missiles’ propulsion relied on liquid fuel which 
1 One kiloton (Kt) is equivalent to one thousand tons of TNT and one megaton (Mt) is equivalent 
to one million tons of TNT.
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requires several hours of preparation making them vulnerable to a first strike. 
It was only during the 80’s that China was able to develop an intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-5 (Lewis and Di, 1992: 18-19). Nevertheless, the 
DF-5 was silo-based and had intricate operational requirements that undermined a 
second strike capability. Still, if Chinese nuclear land capabilities presented some 
shortcomings, the maritime and air dimensions of the nuclear triad present addi-
tional limitations to the military leadership (Manning et al., 2000: 18).
In 1964, when China developed nuclear devices, even without a declaratory 
strategy or operational doctrine, its leadership defined two policies that would 
serve as guidelines for its nuclear weapons. The first is the “No-First Use” (NFU) 
policy. Under this policy China pledges to other nuclear powers that will not use 
nuclear weapons unless it is firstly attacked by the opponent’s nuclear forces. 
Another nuclear policy advocated by China is the opposition to a nuclear arms 
race. The main idea behind these policies is that China’s nuclear posture is not 
based on equivalence but on retaliation capability (also known as second strike). 
Even without an official nuclear strategy, it is possible to still see the influence of 
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping during the first few decades of the Chinese nuclear 
policies. Only in a 2006 Defense White Paper, and for the first time, did China 
clearly state its official nuclear strategy.2 Although named as “Self-Defense Nuclear 
Strategy”, its two guiding principles (“counterattack in self-defense” and “limited 
development of nuclear weapons”) are still based on the NFU and the “opposition 
to nuclear arms race” policies defined decades earlier. It should also be noted that 
in 2000, the Chinese strategic forces had already developed some military theory 
for nuclear operations, namely nuclear counterstrike campaigns and the central 
role of survivability of the nuclear weapons forces (including mobility and conceal-
ment). Nevertheless, these does little to alter the core of the Chinese nuclear strat-
egy – the deterrence of nuclear weapons attack – which relies on the second strike 
capability. This raises an interesting point. While some authors defend that China 
has a credible minimum deterrence, others disagree as China’s nuclear strategy 
is not uniquely focused on counter-value strikes and on a specific number of 
weapons, traditional signs of this minimum deterrence policy (Fravel and Medei-
ros, 2010: 48-79). Likewise, some accounts report that around a third of the Chinese 
nuclear arsenal has tactical yield weapons (Manning et al., 2000: 17).
India
The Indian quest for nuclear deterrence represents one of the most complex, 
although interesting, pathways towards nuclear weapons development. Unlike 
2 The Chinese Defense White Paper of 2006, is available at http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/
doctrine/wp2006.html.
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most nuclear powers that planed nuclear tests as a preliminary step to develop 
their strategic arsenal, India’s development of nuclear weapons had two distinctive 
phases. A first phase with the sole purpose of having a nuclear program without 
contemplating the option of nuclear weapons development and a second phase 
where the Indian leadership clearly decided to achieve a nuclear deterrence capa-
bility. 
As mentioned, India initiated its nuclear journey by developing a civilian nuclear 
energy program, namely by commencing a nuclear physics research program in 
1945 at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR). A couple of years later 
this research got further support by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
who saw in the civilian nuclear infrastructure an instrument to improve Indian 
economic self-reliance and eradicate poverty. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Nehru 
publicly disagreed with both the production and the use of nuclear weapons in 
international politics, a likely sign of the influence of Gandhi’s non-violent conflict 
resolution beliefs in Indian political decision-makers.
In 1956, India built its first nuclear infrastructure, the Apsara nuclear light-water 
reactor, with the assistance of the United Kingdom that also supplied 80% of the 
enriched uranium (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003). Four years later, New Delhi 
began to operate a CIRUS nuclear heavy-water reactor built with the support of the 
US and Canada as the Indian authorities vowed to both countries that the reactor, 
and its plutonium, would be solely used for peaceful purposes (Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, 2003). This particular reactor had a nine to ten kilogram plutonium 
output per year, enough to produce one to two nuclear fission devices per year.
Although with access to plutonium, and consequently the ability to manufacture a 
nuclear weapon, India refrained – for 14 years – from performing its first nuclear 
test. Such prolonged chronological intermission raises questions on the major fac-
tors behind the decision to carry out a nuclear test more than a decade later. The 
Chinese factor proved to be a major influence in this particular aspect. More spe-
cifically, the direct influence of China on India’s policy-makers can be traced to two 
important events. The first one occurred in 1962, when India and China were 
involved in a border conflict which led to a Chinese incursion on Indian territory 
thus creating what currently remains the biggest border disputed area in the world, 
comprising over three thousand kilometers. As China advanced and occupied 
Indian controlled areas, a growing sentiment of insecurity began to rise among 
India’s policy-making circles. Furthermore, politicians from the North of India as 
well as some Indian nuclear scientists began to defend the necessity of performing 
a nuclear test in order to deter China’s armed forces from further territorial incur-
sions. As previously mentioned, Gandhi’s principle of non-violence and interna-
tional cooperation had a profound influence over the Indian National Congress 
Party which later decided to refrain from performing any nuclear test. The decision 
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was based on the belief that by not carrying out a nuclear explosion, India would 
maintain a moral superiority vis-à-vis China (Izuyama and Ogawa, 2003: 60-61).
Two years later, a second Chinese related event had a significant impact on Indian 
strategic circles, namely the 1964 nuclear test. Since 1960 that Indian policy-makers 
were anticipating the Chinese nuclear test but got increasingly worried as this 
proved to be a massive advantage for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in a time 
when India was investing significantly on conventional weaponry following its 
1962 military defeat (Kennedy, 2011: 124-125).
Still, Prime Minister Nehru maintained his strong opposition to nuclear weapons 
albeit months later, after his death, the new Prime Minister Lal Shastri decided to 
pursue a different strategy: assure nuclear protection from nuclear powers. 
Although easier than developing nuclear weapons, some Indian politicians feared 
that such decision could compromise India’s international non-alignment posture. 
In this particular aspect, the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 proved to be pivotal. As 
this border dispute erupted, China supported Islamabad and threatened to open a 
second war front against India in the Himalayan border. Once again pressure 
mounted against the Indian Prime Minister in order to develop nuclear weaponry 
leading to a minor change in India’s nuclear options. According to Prime Minister 
Shastri, if China developed enhanced nuclear delivery systems, India would revise 
its nuclear options. Faced with the possibility of a two front war against its main 
regional opponents, India – now under the leadership of a new Prime Minister, 
Indira Gandhi – begun to procure nuclear assurances from either the US or Soviet 
Union against an hypothetical Chinese attack (Mohan, 1998: 378).
Indian efforts proved to be unsuccessful as both countries failed to provide the 
explicit guarantees sought by India. Years later, in 1969, as the relationship between 
China and Soviet Union deteriorated further, the latter begun to approach India 
with the intent to create a collective security system in Asia to counterbalance 
China. Although initially uninterested, New Delhi later accepted to debate the idea 
as soon as the Soviet Union offered to cease military assistance to Pakistan. In 1971, 
the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed mostly 
due to the war in East Pakistan (presently Bangladesh) and the improved US-China 
diplomatic ties. This last aspect was particularly concerning to India, as the US 
Secretary of State admitted to the Indian ambassador in Washington that his coun-
try would not help India against China in case New Delhi took military action 
against Pakistan (Kennedy, 2011: 135-136).
Other strategic decision made at the time by Indian policy-makers entailed the sup-
port of international disarmament agenda which ultimately impacted the option 
of performing a nuclear test. In order to follow upon this particular diplomatic 
agenda, India initially supported the negotiations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) but failed in the purpose of including “nuclear peaceful explosions” 
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for non-nuclear States in the draft text of the Treaty. Other purposes envisioned by 
India for this Treaty also proved to be unsuccessful. For example, achieving an ade-
quate balance between non-nuclear and nuclear powers, namely in terms of access 
to civilian nuclear technology as well as the adoption of a nuclear nonproliferation 
policy as a core pillar of this Treaty with the final purpose of universal nuclear dis-
armament, specifically for nuclear powers. Furthermore, after failing to assure the 
previously mentioned nuclear protection from both superpowers, India adopted a 
less active posture in the negotiations. Finally, in 1968, when the US, Soviet Union 
and the United Kingdom signed the NPT, India chose not to do so for two specific 
reasons. Firstly, China became a NPT recognized nuclear State and secondly, the 
Treaty sought to maintain the non-nuclear weapons status of states without recip-
rocal nuclear disarmament obligations from nuclear weapons states. Unlike in the 
past, this decision was less based on moral grounds but more on strategic impera-
tives that required India to maintain its nuclear weapons option available (Gan-
guly, 1999: 152-158).
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was another important factor behind India’s deci-
sion to carry out a nuclear test. Even though India came victorious from this con-
frontation with Pakistan, for the first time in its history it felt the direct pressure 
from a nuclear weapons State, namely when the USS Enterprise aircraft carrier 
entered the Bay of Bengal to compel India into accepting a cease-fire that clearly 
benefited Pakistan. Ultimately that bluntly demonstrated to India the coercive 
power present in the mere possession of nuclear weapons and its strategic impact 
(Ghose, 1997: 242-243).
As New Delhi’s leadership begun to realize that the major powers will not properly 
assuage the Indian security needs and witnesses the increase in Chinese nuclear 
capabilities, in 1971 the decision is made to perform a nuclear test. Due to domestic 
political reasons, the test was delayed for three years and, in May of 1974, a 15 Kt 
nuclear fission device was detonated in what was described as a “peaceful nuclear 
explosion”. The test itself was not only a way to prove the international community 
that India had the ability to develop a nuclear engine but also as a political inde-
pendence demonstration towards great powers namely the Soviet Union (Kennedy, 
2011: 140). Consequently, Canada and the US issued strong criticism against this 
test and ceased any nuclear cooperation with India. China and Soviet Union fol-
lowed suit and voiced their disagreement against the Indian nuclear test. Without 
external support India was left with no other choice than to develop a self-sufficient 
domestic nuclear program (Ganguly, 1999: 160). 
At this stage it is important to bear in mind that detonating a nuclear engine and 
possessing a nuclear weapon are two distinct technical achievements. In 1974, 
while India successfully achieved the former it was still far from developing the 
latter. Nevertheless, unlike other countries, after the nuclear test, India did not 
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immediately pursue a nuclear weapons capability. Instead it claimed that it had no 
desire to develop nuclear weapons and kept the option open, which became known 
as the “option policy” (Izuyama and Ogawa, 2003: 61).
Before New Delhi decided to enter on the second phase of its nuclear endeavors 
and initiate its weapons development, Indian policy-makers decided to suspend 
any progresses in this field. Different reasons explain why it took so much time to 
begin building its nuclear arsenal. Besides international pressure, domestic reac-
tions after the 1974 nuclear test were among some of the reasons behind such delay. 
Due to domestic political turmoil, Indira Gandhi had lost the elections and Morarji 
Desai replaced her. The new Indian leader opposes nuclear weapons on moral 
grounds and suspends any efforts linked to its development (Latif, 2014: 133). Not-
withstanding the aversion towards nuclear weapons present in some Indian politi-
cal circles, high costs behind the development of these weapons were factors impor-
tant for Indian decision-makers. 
The enhancement of the Indo-Soviet ties was also a pivotal factor behind the deci-
sion to postpone the development of a nuclear arsenal. As the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979, the US renew its military support to Pakistan including the 
sale of nuclear capable F-16. Facing the possibility of losing the conventional supe-
riority over Pakistan, India sought military assistance from the Soviet Union (Vohra, 
2013: 250). For example, in 1987, the CIA estimated that the Soviet military assis-
tance and sales had largely surpassed the $ 10 billion limit. This assessment also 
stated that 65 per cent of the combat aircraft, 40 per cent of the tanks and 70 per cent 
of the warships in India had Soviet origin (Central Intelligence Agency, 1987: 41-42). 
Considering such facts, it is no surprise that between 1964 and 1985, India became 
the largest Soviet trade recipient in the developing world (Lee, 2014: 63).
Additionally the 1979 Soviet invasion, besides renewing the approach between 
the US and Pakistan, would have another significant impact as it decreased the 
US-restrictions on the Pakistani nuclear program (Kennedy, 2011: 141). At this time, 
not only did the Pakistani nuclear efforts begun to concern India but the situation 
in Kashmir further aggravated and preliminary evidence on the Chinese nuclear 
assistance to Pakistan emerged, namely on warhead designs (Ramana, 2011). Antic-
ipating the increasingly palpable Pakistani desire for nuclear weapons, the Indian 
policy-makers begun to gain interest in nuclear weaponry. Several facts corroborate 
this interest. Firstly, the government decided to initiate an indigenous ballistic mis-
siles program in 1983, named “Integrated Guided Missile Development Program”, 
as an early response to the Pakistani nuclear developments (Kampani, 2014: 88). 
Secondly, in 1984, during an interview, A. Q. Khan – the mentor of the Pakistani 
nuclear program – declared Pakistan as a nuclear power. During the same period, 
an article of the Washington Post claimed that Pakistan had already tested explo-
sives of nonnuclear components and could manufacture a bomb in less than a 
Francisco Galamas
 113 Nação e Defesa
week. The Indian media immediately picked up on this story and exacerbated it 
by claiming that Pakistan had already tested a nuclear device. Although the 
government tried to correct that misperception, all the efforts proved to be unsuc-
cessful. Thirdly, as India carried out a series of large scale military exercises near the 
Pakistani border, known as “Brasstacks”, it failed to properly inform the Pakistan’s 
military authorities. As Islamabad saw the Indian military moves near its border, it 
responded by placing a significant number of its military units on the same area, 
while Pakistan stakeholders hinted a likely use of nuclear weapons (Izuyama and 
Ogawa, 2003: 62). Already having the impression that Pakistan had some nuclear 
capability, the Indian military planners envisioned a preemptive strike against 
Pakistan, including to its nuclear facilities so to prevent any nuclear retaliation. In 
the aftermath of this crisis, the domestic pressure begun to pile for India to achieve 
a nuclear weapons status to counter any Pakistani development in this field (Perko-
vich, 2001: 279-282).
Although it is hard to pinpoint the precise moment when Prime Minister Gandhi 
decided to start the development of nuclear weapons, sometime between 1987 and 
1989, due to the Pakistani advancements on the nuclear weapons field, a concern 
also shared by US officials at the time (Weisman, 1987). Concomitantly, New Delhi 
also accelerated its missile program and in 1989 tested the first Indian manufac-
tured intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with nuclear weapons capability 
and based on a civilian space program (Milhollin, 1989). Additional progresses 
included the ability to reprocess plutonium and the acquisition of sufficient fissile 
material for 25 nuclear weapons. 
At the same time, India’s nuclear security assurances started to fade. For example, 
in 1986 during an Indo-Chinese border clash the Soviet Union failed to support 
India and with the end of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Moscow 
approaches Pakistan. Finally, with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, New Delhi 
recognized that it no longer could rely on nuclear powers to counterbalance 
Pakistani and Chinese nuclear weapons programs (Kennedy, 2011: 141-144). 
Moreover, although the US ceased to support Pakistan in 1990, five years later the 
Clinton Administration approved legislation to support military and economically 
Pakistan, an attempt that had the ultimate purpose – although fruitless – of pre-
venting the additional development of its nuclear weapons.
Additionally, India’s renewed nuclear diplomacy efforts failed once more to yield 
the desired outcomes. As Indian diplomats expected the NPT to cease, after its ini-
tial 25 years duration expired, the State-Parties decided to indefinitely extend the 
duration of the Treaty, thus increasing the pressure for India to accede the NPT. 
Simultaneously, the international community was also attempting to draft a Treaty 
to ban nuclear tests – the Complete Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). While India supported 
the initial negotiations of the first CTBT drafts, it ultimately decided to walk away 
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from it for two specific reasons. First, it feared the effects of the CTBT on its nuclear 
program and, secondly, China performed a nuclear test prior to signing this Treaty. 
This development allowed China to have a better understanding of nuclear wea- 
pons, unlike India that just performed one nuclear test (Kimball and Taheran, 2015).
Embedded in this diplomatic and regional security context, the Indian domestic 
support for nuclear weapons increased as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the 
1998 general elections after campaigning for the development of nuclear weapons. 
Notwithstanding the technical and political conditions that allowed India to 
initiate the production of a nuclear arsenal, the prompting factor was the 1998 Paki-
stani test of the nuclear capable Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) 
(Ganguly, 1999: 167-171). Between 11 and 13 May of 1998, India performs Pokhran-
II, a series of five nuclear weapon explosion tests, including four fission-based 
weapons and one (attempted) fusion-based weapon, thus announcing to the inter-
national community that it was a de facto nuclear weapons State. Even though this 
test came as an expected outcome for some countries, others were not expecting it. 
For example, the US was caught by surprise as a CIA report written a month before 
the tests had no mention to the possibility that India might carry a nuclear weapon 
test (Central Intelligence Agency, 1998).
One year later, India presented the first draft of its Nuclear Doctrine, issued by the 
National Security Advisory Board, only approved years later. A press release pub-
lished by Indian Prime Minister’s Office clearly summarizes India’s nuclear doc-
trine. First, and foremost, the Indian nuclear posture aims to achieve and maintain 
a credible minimum deterrent. This sort of posture lies on the premise that the 
adopted nuclear strategy is based on containment. Operationally, it means that the 
nuclear forces will be equipped and operate with the purpose of surviving an initial 
nuclear strike (known as first strike) and be capable of retaliating with nuclear 
weapons. To reinforce these particular aspects, the second mentioned aspect of 
India’s nuclear posture is the “No First Use” policy. By adopting this particular 
policy, India reinstates that the use of nuclear weapons is purely defensive and will 
only be considered if attacked with similar weapons. A third central element states 
that “nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unac-
ceptable damage”, which leads us to assume that India nuclear retaliation strategy 
is based on counter-value targeting. Nuclear doctrine outlines that counter-value 
targeting is aimed at valuable civilian targets, such as cities and civilian population, 
unlike counterforce targeting that looks for the destruction of military targets. 
Other elements of the Indian nuclear doctrine include a pledge to not use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states as well as to maintain its nuclear dis-
armament and nonproliferation diplomacy commitment. Finally, the nuclear pos-
ture designates the entities that control and authorize the use of nuclear weapons, 
in an attempt to bluntly demonstrate that the nuclear arsenal is under civilian con-
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trol (Indian Prime Minister’s Office, 2003). A deeper analysis at the Indian nuclear 
posture also allows us to understand that by adopting a nuclear stance that resem-
bles the one embraced by China, India openly assumes that China is the primary 
strategic opponent. This is an important point that bears consequences in South 
Asia trilateral nuclear dynamics, which will be discussed later.
Pakistan
The Pakistani interest in a nuclear program began in the 50’s decade and basically 
with civilian purposes. Taking advantage of the “Atoms for Peace” Program inau-
gurated by US President Eisenhower, Pakistan created the Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission in 1956 and the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology 
(PINSTECH) seven years later. Initially, the US supplied Pakistan a nuclear research 
reactor and, in 1972, the Canadian KANUPP-1 nuclear reactor was finished and 
Islamabad had its initial nuclear infrastructures. 
For several reasons, while holding the position of Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto developed an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. First, as China con-
ducted its initial nuclear test, in 1964, the Pakistani political decision-making circles 
begun to understand that it would be a matter of time before India followed suit. 
Second, the diplomatic ties between India and Pakistan begun to deteriorate. Ulti-
mately, this status quo created the framework from which the Indo-Pakistani Wars 
of 1965 and 1971 erupted. Third, due to what was perceived by the Pakistanis as an 
insufficient support by the US during the 1965 clash with India, Islamabad begun 
to grow increasingly suspicious of the real consistency of its alliance with the US – 
at the time the main Pakistani military supplier. Furthermore, because the 1965 war 
clearly showed an Indian conventional superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan, Washington’s 
decision to put both countries under a weapons embargo was seen by Islamabad as 
clearly beneficial to India. Finally, as international nuclear disarmament diplomacy 
started to gather a growing amount of supporting countries, Pakistan feared that a 
Treaty banning nuclear weapons would either impede its access to the latter or 
bring additional isolation for Islamabad. This political anxiety got more exacer-
bated as India decided to reject the NPT in 1968 (Ahmed, 1999: 180-183).
Addressing these issues is important to understand that the major factors behind 
the Pakistani decision to develop nuclear weapons predates the 1974 Indian nuclear 
test. Moreover, as the 1971 Indo-Pakistani confrontations led to an additional defeat 
of Pakistan and the loss of East Pakistan, the perception that India constituted a 
strategic threat was reinforced. Consequently, in 1972, President Ali Bhutto held a 
meeting with Pakistani nuclear scientists in which he requested the development of 
nuclear weapons. So when New Delhi decided to conduct its “peaceful nuclear 
explosion” the decision to follow suit had already been taken and solely reinforced 
the Pakistani goal of achieving a nuclear weapons capability.
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In order to access nuclear weapons, Pakistan intended to develop both HEU and 
plutonium. Because purchasing HEU was not a viable option, the decision was 
made to start building uranium enrichment facilities and Pakistani authorities 
entrusted A. Q. Khan with the task. Moreover, not only he succeed in producing 
HEU for military purposes as he developed a complex and efficient illicit network 
of nuclear materials trafficking that allowed Pakistan to successfully build nuclear 
weapons. According to A. Q. Khan itself, Pakistan began to enrich uranium in 1978 
and achieved 90% uranium enrichment capability around 1983 (Kerr and Nikitin, 
2013: 3-4, 21).
Plutonium, on the other hand, required the development of reprocessing facilities. 
In 1976, Pakistan signed an agreement with the French Societe Generale des Tech-
niques Nouvelles (SGN) for the construction of plutonium reprocessing facilities. 
Several reasons explain why Pakistan looked for the French nuclear know-how to 
build a nuclear reactor and a reprocessing facility. First, like Pakistan, at the time 
France had yet to become a State-Party of the NPT and possessed one of the most 
advanced civil nuclear technology. Second, Pakistan did not had many options to 
access to nuclear technology. The US and the United Kingdom were substantial 
sponsors of the nuclear nonproliferation movement and the Soviet Union was rein-
forcing its diplomatic ties with India. West Germany was also under US influence 
so it would not be a viable nuclear technology supplier. Third, there was a belief in 
Pakistan that France was interested in this deal. Not only did French companies 
competed with US rivals in the nuclear field but it was assumed that France wanted 
to expand its influence in third world countries. Finally, Pakistani policy-makers 
thought that France could withstand US pressure to cease the deal (Dar, 2015: 218).
Nonetheless, in 1977, the French authorities unilaterally withdraw from this deal 
due to pressure exerted by the US. Interestingly enough, in the same year, a military 
coup led by General Zial-ul-Haq overthrew the then Prime Minister Ali Bhutto. As 
the Pakistani population began to link the US pressure on the plutonium reprocess-
ing deal and the military coup, the nuclear weapons program started to be seen as 
a symbol of sovereignty and prestige. Furthermore, with Pakistan’s constant pro-
gresses in its nuclear program the Carter Administration decided to impose sanc-
tions, which may have accentuated Pakistanis nationalistic view of their nuclear 
endeavors (Cohen, 2010: 84).
As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had a 
pivotal effect on the Pakistani nuclear program. The nearby presence of Soviet 
troops turned Pakistan into a strategic ally for the US once more, which in turn 
allowed a significant progress in the nuclear infrastructure throughout the 80’s dec-
ade. With the retreat of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold 
War, Pakistan lost its strategic importance to the US thus bringing additional scru-
tiny to the former’s nuclear program. This allowed Washington, for instance, to 
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pressure Pakistan to limit its enrichment capabilities to 5 per cent. However, this 
pressure came a bit too late as Pakistan had already understood how useful could 
nuclear weapons be not only to deter opponents but to serve as a bargaining chip 
in international diplomacy. For instance, in 1990, as relations between Islamabad 
and New Delhi deteriorated, Pakistani nuclear threats against India brought the US 
as a mediator in the conflict.
As a consequence, Pakistan decided to remove the limits on its enrichment capa-
bilities, abandoning its nuclear ambiguity policy while acknowledging its nuclear 
weapons production capability. The US quickly imposed sanctions once more and 
in 1991 Prime Minister Sharif restored the previous uranium enrichment limits. 
Albeit with limitations on developing HEU, the Pakistani nuclear program kept 
progressing, namely on the production of enriched uranium (although it was still 
low-enriched uranium), the development of warhead designs, the expansion of 
uranium enrichment capabilities and the construction of a Chinese-supplied pluto-
nium production reactor (Cirincione et al., 2005: 245).
Simultaneously, while understanding the potential that nuclear weapons could 
have in the diplomatic arena, Pakistan starts to support international nuclear non-
proliferation initiatives – namely the NPT or the CTBT – on the premise that any 
Indian nuclear weapons efforts would cease. Although the Indian nuclear threat 
was a pivotal factor behind these initiatives, the clear objective behind these actions 
was the removal of the US sanctions. Nevertheless, with the election of the Hindu-
nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, the nuclear status quo in the region 
was transformed. For once, during the campaign the BJP advocated the abandon-
ment of India’s nuclear ambiguity doctrine over a policy that openly supported 
“nuclear weaponization” which will be later followed by a rejection of any negotia-
tions over the Kashmir issue. Notwithstanding the nationalist approach of the BJP, 
the Pakistani military apparatus also did not approve Prime Minister Sharif’s 
attempt to initiate negotiations with India over Kashmir (Ahmed, 1999: 190-193).
In order to match the Indian short and intermediate range missile capabilities, Paki-
stan decided to test the nuclear capable Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile in 
April of 1998. As previously mentioned, India responded to this missile test with a 
series of nuclear weapons tests on the following month (Synnott, 1999: 26). Although 
facing pressure not to respond to the Indian nuclear explosions, the Pakistan did 
not complied with international requests and carried out five nuclear underground 
tests two weeks later. Albeit it seems obvious the reasons why Pakistan followed 
the same nuclear path as India, other motives also played an important role in 
Islamabad’s decision. For instance, Pakistan would not accept a non-nuclear status 
when India had just openly admitted its nuclear weapons capability. It was not just 
a matter of balance of power in the region but also a matter of international pres-
tige. 
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Currently, Pakistan does not have a publicly declared nuclear doctrine but it is pos-
sible to identify four of its major aspects. First, although Pakistan clearly states that 
its nuclear arsenal aims to deter all forms of external aggression, its primary deter-
rence target is India. Second, the Pakistani nuclear doctrine is based on a minimum 
credible deterrence. Although it sounds very similar to India’s nuclear posture of 
credible minimum deterrence, the difference is more than semantical. Contrary to 
an Indian posture based on a minimalist nuclear arsenal, Pakistan’s policy relies on 
credibility in order to assure its opponents that it can cause unacceptable damage. 
Third, contrary to China and India, Pakistan does not have a “No First-Use” nuclear 
policy. The reason lies on the premise that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal does not 
have the sole purpose of balancing the Indian nuclear capabilities but also to deter 
any hypothetical Indian conventional incursions inside the Pakistani territory. 
Notwithstanding the absence of a formal declaration stating how Pakistan may 
contemplate the initial use of nuclear weapons, revelations from Pakistan’s General 
Kidwai have highlighted some circumstances in which such may be considered, 
including: (1) if India attacks Pakistan and occupies a significant portion of its 
territory; (2) if an Indian attack destroys a significant part of Pakistani ground and 
air forces; (3) if India strangles the Pakistani economy, namely through naval 
blockages or by altering the course of the Indu river and; (4) If India politically 
destabilizes or provokes a “large scale internal subversion” in Pakistan. Although 
the last two circumstances are not seen as likely to trigger nuclear weapons use, the 
same cannot be said about the first two. Nonetheless, Pakistan has pledged not to 
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States unless they are a part of 
a coalition with a nuclear weapons country. 
Fourth, the strategic requirements of Pakistan’s nuclear posture are dynamic as 
they are highly dependent on the threat perception emanating from India. Conse-
quently, any modernization or upgrade efforts made by India – either in terms of its 
conventional or nuclear arsenal – will resonate on the quantitative and qualitative 
parameters of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. This is one of the reasons why Pakistan 
is highly ambiguous on its (unwritten) nuclear doctrine. It creates uncertainty and 
avoids supplying India with any course of action below the nuclear threshold 
(Fitzpatrick, 2013: 27-32; Krepon, 2012: 7-11). Next we will explain how these three 
nuclear doctrines and postures interact with each other.
Trilateral Nuclear Dynamic in South Asia
Understanding how the nuclear dynamics works in the South Asia requires a 
deeper look on how the nuclear arsenals have developed over the past years and 
how do they impact the other countries involved in this regional dynamic.
Starting with the Chinese nuclear arsenal. This country has been basing its nuclear 
modernization efforts into two specific areas. First, the current modernization pro-
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cess aims to be gradual with the aspiration to replace the old missiles based on 60’s 
and 70’s technology. Second, strategic imperatives created the need to have more 
credible and mobile missile capabilities upgraded with missile defense counter-
measures in order to ensure a second strike capability (Fravel and Medeiros, 2010: 
81-82). 
To achieve these two major goals, China decided to take a number of steps. On its 
ground missile forces, efforts have been directed to substitute liquid fuel vectors for 
solid-fuel ones while increasing the mobility of the latter. Additionally, China has 
been pursuing substantial investments on building a credible naval second strike 
capability including a new Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine 
(SSBN) and is already planning for the next generation of SSBN, the Type 096. To 
better enhance the naval branch of the Chinese nuclear triad, Beijing is also devel-
oping new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), which according to esti-
mates made by the US could reach as much as 7400 kilometers and have MIRV 
capabilities. By 2020, the Chinese military apparatus expects to develop a new 
SLBM, the JL-3, with 11 thousand kilometers range and with MIRV capability as 
well. In terms of its Air Force, China is upgrading its nuclear bombers and produc-
ing its first nuclear long-range cruise missiles, the CJ-10k (Galamas, 2015: 31-33).
But why is China investing so much in the upgrade of its nuclear platforms? As 
previously mentioned, one of the major factors behind Chinese development of 
nuclear weapons was the fear of an US nuclear attack. Nowadays, albeit the Chi-
nese need to replace some of its nuclear vectors, the strategic competition in Asia 
still mandates that China can be able to uphold an effective deterrence capability 
vis-à-vis the US. To keep such capability, China has been reacting to two specific 
technological platforms that the US is slowly implementing in its military doctrine 
and could impact China’s assured second strike capability, which its nuclear doc-
trine is based upon. 
The first is the placement of antimissile intercepting systems in Northeast Asia. Due 
to the fear of a North Korean ballistic missiles launch, the US placed in Japan seven 
destroyers equipped with the Aegis antimissile systems in order to support Tokyo’s 
four layered missile defense structure. Over the last months, there was negotiations 
between the US and the South Korean government over the placement of a THAAD 
antimissile system. Notwithstanding that these systems are supposed to intercept 
any missile launches from North Korea, they could also undermine China’s nuclear 
deterrence capabilities. To properly deal with this threat to its second strike capabil-
ity, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been modifying some of its nuclear 
missiles. For instance, some missiles, like the DF-41 ICBM (which is still under 
development), are planned to have MIRV and MaRV warheads incorporated as 
well as other missile defense countermeasures. Beijing is also trying to develop an 
antimissile intercepting system. In 2014, according to government sources, it con-
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ducted its third antimissile test without providing further details, after previous 
tests in 2010 and 2013. However, China is also conducting anti-satellite weapons 
tests which rely on the same “hit-to-kill” principle that the antimissile interceptors 
do so it is currently unclear what the final purpose of this technology is (Keck, 
2014).
The other US development that could have an impact in China’s strategic arsenal is 
the adoption of the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) system. When operational, the PGS 
will allow the US military to strike any target, in less than one hour, with high pre-
cision, resorting to hypersonic platforms. Faced with the risk of having its nuclear 
delivery platforms destroyed in a preemptive nuclear strike, China has been 
upgrading its nuclear arsenal. As already mentioned, the Chinese nuclear ground 
forces have been modified in order to have enhanced mobility and therefore more 
difficult to target (Galamas, 2015: 35-39).
Albeit the US is the main driving force behind the Chinese nuclear modernization, 
the nuclear progresses verified in India have an impact on the latter process as well. 
Point in fact, in 2015, the Pentagon mentioned in one of its report about China’s 
military capabilities that India’s nuclear endeavors were an additional driver for 
the Chinese nuclear modernization (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015: 31-32). 
Since India carried out its first “peaceful nuclear” explosion that China has been 
following closely New Delhi nuclear efforts. After the Indian 1974 nuclear test, the 
Chinese authorities responded with a thermonuclear test and throughout this dec-
ade expanded its ballistic missiles reach in order to cover Indian cities. However, 
China has avoided a direct competition with the Indian nuclear program and 
instead decided to support Pakistani nuclear capabilities opening another nuclear 
front forcing India to divert military capabilities away from China (Pardesi, 2015: 
341).
This Chinese-Pakistani nuclear cooperation probably began in 1976, although it 
took more than a decade for both countries to sign a formal treaty on this topic, and 
it has allowed Islamabad to achieve significant nuclear progresses. According to 
published reports, in 1982 China supplied 50 kilograms of HEU to Pakistan to build 
two nuclear bombs and a year later a design for a 25Kt nuclear weapon was also 
given to the Pakistani military. But the nuclear assistance was not solely related to 
weapons as the cooperation included technical support in fissile material produc-
tion. In 1985, Chinese technicians supported Pakistan’s Kahuta facility in the pro-
duction of weapons-enriched uranium and, seven years later, China announced the 
construction of a nuclear power plant in Pakistan. After the Pakistani 1998 nuclear 
tests, the joint nuclear efforts picked up pace and China agreed to support the con-
struction of four nuclear reactors in Pakistan. More recently, the Chinese authorities 
announced further support for the construction of 5 additional nuclear reactors 
(Parameswaran, 2015). Moreover, additional Chinese assistance to the Pakistani 
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ballistic missile program has been also granted over the years. In 1988, Pakistan had 
access to Chinese M-11 nuclear capable short-range ballistic missiles and other 
accounts mention China’s (as well as North Korea’s) pivotal role in the Hatf-1, 
Hatf-2 and Shaheen missile programs (Paul, 2003: 4-5).
All these efforts struck a nerve on India’s strategic elite as New Delhi has yet to 
achieve an assured second strike capability against China. In order to achieve it, 
India has been upgrading its missiles (especially their range), developing a mari-
time nuclear deterrence and antimissile systems. For example, due to the limited 
range of the Indian nuclear bombers as the country lacks air-refueling capabilities 
– besides being unable to surpass the Chinese air defenses – a decision was made to 
start a missile program in 1983 (Kumar and Vannoni, 2004: 20). With the specific 
purpose of deterring China, ballistic missiles such as the Agni-III (3500 kilometers) 
and Agni-V (5000 kilometers) were developed (Chansoria, 2011: 2). Still, India 
wishes to add new nuclear delivery platforms as the currently and under develop-
ment Agni-VI ICBM with 10 thousand kilometers range clearly demonstrates 
(Panda, 2015a). For India, the most important strategic nuclear objective is to have 
an assured second strike capability and, more importantly, capable of reaching the 
majority of Chinese cities. 
Other missile upgrades include development of mobile canister-launchers to allow 
quicker missile launches as well as the addition of MIRV warheads to the Indian 
ballistic missiles in order to tackle the Chinese missile defense upgrades (Kris-
tensen, 2013). Furthermore, factors as international prestige and great power aspi-
rations are also important aspects to be considered when debating the development 
of long range missiles in India. A point worth mentioning is that India does not seek 
a quantitative parity towards the Chinese nuclear arsenal but aims to adapt its arse-
nal to the current security context and to the technological upgrades made by 
regional opponents in order to maintain its nuclear credibility. 
If we consider nuclear tests, for instance, China has carried out around 45 tests with 
several types of nuclear devices while India has only performed six. Similar differ-
ences are also present in other aspects of the Indian atomic arsenal. Indian strategic 
community believes that an assured nuclear retaliation capability will only be 
achieved once India fully develops maritime nuclear delivery platforms (Pardesi, 
2015: 343-344). Efforts in this direction have been made. India has already built a 
SSBN – the INS Arihant – which is currently undergoing sea trials while another 
three additional SSBN are planned for construction until 2020 (Saksena, 2015). The 
problem currently lies on the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) for these 
SSBN. India’s only successfully tested SLBM, the K-15, has a 700 kilometers range 
which is insufficient to reach the major Chinese strategic assets. Another SLBM has 
been under development by India, the K-4, but its range (between 1500 and 3000 
kilometers) is still insufficient to uphold a maritime nuclear deterrence capability 
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vis-à-vis China. Analysts consider that without a SLBM with 5000 kilometers range 
it is highly doubtful that India can target the majority of the cities in China without 
exposing their SSBN to the superior Chinese naval capabilities (Pardesi, 2015: 345). 
Other problems arise from command and control issues that the SSBN bring may 
also prove to be a significant hurdle for New Delhi.
Finally, India is developing an antimissile intercepting system. The idea for an 
Indian domestically-built missile defense system appeared in the 1990’s after Paki-
stan acquired the Chinese supplied M-9 and M-11 missiles (Sharma, 2009: 1-5). 
Currently, the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is 
trying to develop a two-layered antimissile system (comprising the Prithvi Air 
Defence system and the Advanced Air Defence system) in order to intercept mis-
siles (Narang, 2013: 146). Still years away from achieving operational status, the last 
tests have proved to be unsuccessful but carry a strong strategic impact to the 
region. 
As India is seeking MIRV warheads to counter the possibility of a Chinese antimis-
sile system, a similar impact could be witnessed in Pakistan. The lack of confidence 
in its nuclear delivery means may lead Pakistan into a quantitative and qualitative 
missile arms race to develop countermeasures for this particular Indian system. 
Another probable consequence could be a stronger Pakistan-China cooperation on 
nuclear and missile related topics. 
Even though India has nuclear forces more than capable of deterring Pakistan, 
New Delhi has adapted some of its arsenal to the nuclear challenges brought by its 
western-neighboring country. Tactical ballistic missiles, such as the nuclear capable 
Prahaar, were developed to complement the Indian “Cold Start” limited war 
doctrine and to strike counterforce targets. It was likely a response to the Pakistan’s 
development of the nuclear capable SRBM Nasr (O’Donnel, 2013).
Another important factor in the region’s nuclear calculus is the 2008 US-India civil-
ian nuclear cooperation deal, known as the 123 Agreement. Under this agreement, 
India would separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, place the former 
under IAEA safeguards and receive US civilian nuclear technology. The US also 
campaigned for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) approval of this deal and 
helped India to gain a “waiver” exempting it from fulfilling all of the NSG rules 
to access the civilian nuclear trade (Squassoni, 2010). Most importantly, these 
arrangements allow New Delhi to access uranium for its nuclear reactors and thus 
diverting its own uranium for military purposes. Some reports claim that the deal 
might put 8 Indian nuclear reactors, with a combined capability to produce enough 
fissile material for 280 nuclear weapons, outside of the AIEA’s safeguards scope 
(Kerr and Nikitin, 2013: 7). 
As a consequence, Pakistan has been improving its capabilities to increase the pro-
duction of HEU and plutonium stock and, consequently, its nuclear arsenal (Squas-
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soni, 2010). As China was also not pleased with this deal as well, it decided to sup-
port the Pakistani nuclear fuel endeavors and the construction of more nuclear 
reactors, such as Chasma-3 and Chasma-4 (Pant, 2012: 91-92). Notwithstanding the 
strategic importance of the US-India civilian nuclear deal, it is important to bear in 
mind that the latter does not constitute an alliance as India wishes to keep its stra-
tegic autonomy. On the other hand, it is highly doubtful that India will achieve an 
assured second strike capability in the short-term against China as its investments 
on its nuclear arsenal – like the new and mobile delivery means, MIRV warheads or 
missile defense systems – are likely to keep the nuclear military gap between New 
Delhi and Beijing. Still, the nuclear dynamic concerning these two countries is 
likely to remain stable over the short term as China clearly has a reliable second 
strike capability vis-à-vis India while the latter has an existential deterrence capabil-
ity vis-à-vis China. This particular type of deterrence implies that although the 
Indian second strike capability is uncertain, the mere presence of nuclear weapons 
and delivery platforms generate sufficient risk of nuclear escalation thus creating a 
de facto nuclear deterrence between both countries (Narang, 2014: 6). Regarding 
Pakistan, India not only has a nuclear arsenal capable of deterring the former coun-
try but its conventional military apparatus is more than capable of handling any 
Pakistani conventional threat. 
Concerning Indian conventional superiority, Pakistan’s nuclear progresses present 
a specific challenge to the region. They do not solely represent a reaction against 
Indian nuclear developments but also to New Delhi’s conventional military superi-
ority. The justification for this posture lies on Pakistan’s inferior military capabili-
ties and the country’s lack of strategic depth. It is also necessary to take into account 
the perception that exists in some Indian policy-makers that the country could sur-
vive a nuclear clash with Pakistan. The growth of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal also 
represents the necessity to have the ability to provoke unacceptable damage on 
India, in case a nuclear confrontation arises. Such “victory denial” strategy aims to 
prevent India from exploring any loophole in the Pakistani nuclear deterrence pos-
ture (Krepon, 2012: 22-23). Finally, and contrary to other nuclear weapons coun-
tries, Pakistan has no desire to international prestige or great power status (Izuy-
ama and Ogawa, 2003: 66). 
As India shifted its focus towards establishing a maritime nuclear deterrence capa-
bility and developing antimissile systems, Pakistan reacted accordingly. It began to 
develop cruise missiles in an attempt to surpass any India antimissile system. 
Besides, as India dedicates substantial investments to develop a SSBN with SLBM 
capability, Pakistan tries to overcome the absence of its own SLBM by developing 
cruise missiles for naval platforms, namely for its submarine fleet. Some analysts 
claim that the Babur cruise missile is being modified to be deployed by Pakistani 
submarines. Once more, China will support Pakistan in this endeavor as, in Octo-
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ber of 2015, both countries signed a deal to build eight submarines (Ansari, 2015). 
All of these ballistic missile improvements are envisioned to reinforce Pakistan’s 
second strike capability. 
Another reason behind the progresses made on the Pakistani SRBM is the Indian 
“Cold Start” Doctrine. This limited war doctrine was developed in 2004 by the 
Indian Army in order to properly respond to Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir. It 
consists on the offensive use of India’s conventional superiority to occupy small 
portions of the Pakistani territory (between 50 to 80 kilometers) in order to gain 
concessions from Islamabad (Ladwig III, 2008: 163-165). Basically, India wanted to 
devise a doctrine that would permit a retaliation against Pakistani support of vio-
lent non-state groups without crossing the nuclear threshold (Kanwal, 2010). As a 
response, Pakistan lowered the nuclear threshold and included tactical nuclear 
weapons as a response to the “Cold Start” Doctrine. For the first time, in October of 
2015, Pakistan – through its Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhary – admitted the 
country’s intention of using tactical and theater level nuclear weapons against 
India (Panda, 2015b). For this particular purpose, Pakistan has been testing SRBM 
like the Nasr and Abdali as a clear demonstration of its intention to employ tactical 
nuclear weapons if necessary (Dalton and Tandler, 2012: 17). As we look into the 
“action-reaction” cycle that characterizes this particular nuclear dynamic, it 
becomes clear that some of the reactions above described may jeopardize the 
regional nuclear stability. 
Stability Risks in the Trilateral Nuclear Dynamic 
When looking at the progresses made or planned by these three nuclear weapons 
countries, it is possible to identify some issues that may be able to have some desta-
bilizing effects in the region. For example, the installation of MIRV warheads in 
nuclear delivery systems can yield a number of consequences. First, missiles with 
MIRV warheads significantly increase the first strike capability and, second, by cre-
ating a security dilemma in the opponent country, these vectors become a desirable 
target therefore inviting an opponent to strike first. If China or India pursue their 
intentions of installing MIRV warheads in their ballistic missiles, it is likely that the 
countries in the region may react accordingly. 
The regional proliferation of cruise missiles and sea-based nuclear platforms may 
also be another element of instability. Not only are cruise missiles difficult to detect 
but they also are “dual-capable” which means that they can carry conventional 
warheads as well nuclear ones. This particular aspect is likely to create additional 
uncertainty in the opponent because it may misinterpret a conventional missile 
launch for a nuclear one (Krepon, 2012: 29).
Furthermore, bringing naval platforms into the regional nuclear deterrence for-
mula could also provoke similar results for different reasons. India is building its 
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first SSBN and is trying to produce a SLBM with sufficient range to establish a more 
effective nuclear deterrence towards China. Pakistan, to counter these break-
throughs, is planning to adapt nuclear cruise missiles for submarines. Both of each 
platforms require highly sophisticated and survivable communications systems so 
these can withstand an initial nuclear strike and be able to receive or cancel a retal-
iation order. The lack of these systems may lead to unauthorized or accidental use 
of nuclear weapons. Other identified issue is the changes in the nuclear force pos-
ture that these platforms provoke. For an adequate sea nuclear deterrence posture, 
the warhead and the delivery vector must be assembled instead of being separated 
as they usually are while on ground platforms. Such posture increases the level of 
readiness and requires that both navies do the utmost to prevent unintended use of 
nuclear weapons (Thomas-Noone and Medcalf, 2015: 10).
Another problem lies in the “action-reaction” cycle behind this trilateral nuclear 
dynamic. If we look into the particular case of China, as it aims to consolidate a 
great power status it is modernizing the nuclear arsenal to deter the US, which is 
likely to influence India to improve its own nuclear weapons which will then fuel a 
regional arms race with Pakistan (Hagerty, 2014: 309).
The nuclear posture of India itself also presents some destabilizing elements. As 
already explained, the official doctrine is based on a credible minimum deterrence 
in order to dissuade two opponents with different nuclear forces. Because China is 
India’s main nuclear opponent, it attempts to balance its nuclear arsenal mainly 
with Beijing instead of Islamabad. The instability rises as India’s endeavors to 
maintain a credible minimum deterrence with China will logically unbalance its 
nuclear dynamic with Pakistan. Another element of this doctrine that requires 
further analysis is the “No-First Use” policy. When looking at the Indian Prime 
Minister's Office press release describing the nuclear doctrine it is possible to read 
“however, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, 
by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with 
nuclear weapons” (Indian Prime Minister’s Office, 2003).
By admitting the use of nuclear weapons against biological or chemical attacks, 
India is falling into a “Commitment Trap”.3 Such decision can bring additional 
3 The “Commitment Trap” is a terminology used by nuclear theorist Scott Sagan in his article 
“The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Bio-
logical and Chemical Weapons Attacks” in which he addresses the unnecessary risks present 
when States threaten the use of nuclear weapons against chemical or biological weapons 
attacks. More specifically the author claims that “… the current nuclear doctrine creates a ‘com-
mitment trap’: threats to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack are 
credible, because if CW or BW are used despite such threats, the U.S. president would feel 
compelled to retaliate with nuclear weapons to maintain his or her international and domestic 
reputation for honoring commitments”. See Sagan (2000: 85-115).
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misperceptions risks that could ultimately lead to an unjustified use of nuclear 
weapons, thus steering away from what truly constitutes a “No-First Use” policy. 
Finally, India must be aware that the improvements made in its nuclear arsenal will 
not only fuel the described nuclear “action-reaction” cycle but lead to a reinforced 
nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and China as well. 
Regarding Pakistan, its nuclear strategy and attempt to have “full-spectrum” deter-
rence also generate additional risks for the regional nuclear stability (e.g. the 
inherent problems linked to the presence of submarine-based cruise missiles). 
Accordingly, tactical nuclear weapons can present Pakistan with similar situations 
linked to the required pre-delegation of launch authorization given to tactical/
operational commanders or the pre-mating of warheads in the delivery systems 
that can undermine some of the safeguards against unauthorized/accidental use of 
nuclear weapons. As the assembled weapons make their way to the battlefield, one 
should also assume the possibility that they might be stolen by non-state groups. 
Finally, the geographical proximity and the lack of real-time surveillance create a 
challenge for deterrence stability especially when it includes the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons possibility (Fitzpatrick, 2013: 51).
Conclusion
Analyzing the nuclear issues that hang over South Asia is not an easy task as it goes 
well beyond the bilateral conundrum that embeds the India-Pakistan diplomatic 
relationship. To properly interpret the facts that surround South Asian nuclear 
weapons issues requires that we do not overlook the dynamic that exists between 
India and China. Changing the analysis framework from a bilateral perspective to 
a trilateral one enables us to adequately understand the nuclear dynamics in this 
region and its impacts.
Considering this particular aspect, addressing the tensions between India and Paki-
stan – as advocated in some published analysis – will only solve some of the causes 
behind the nuclear tensions in South Asia. The strategic dynamic between China 
and India – including its nuclear dimension – has been an overlooked topic in most 
of the nuclear weapons literature focusing on Asia. Still, and albeit overlooked, in 
order to further stabilize this trilateral nuclear dynamic, it is pivotal to understand 
how these nuclear arsenals influence each other to further mitigate their mutual 
impact. 
Another important issue surrounding this trilateral strategic dynamic is linked 
to the US nuclear arsenal and its impact on the Chinese nuclear weapons arsenal. 
Trying to address the strategic problems regarding nuclear weapons in South Asia 
will also need to take into consideration this latter aspect. As the dimensions of the 
Chinese and Indian nuclear arsenals are difficult to compare in terms of quantity 
and quality, it would make more sense to have China negotiating with the US and 
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Russia on nuclear weapons limitations.4 Even if with a very specific scope, such 
agreement could serve as an incentive and a confidence building measure for India 
to engage in a similar initiative with Pakistan.
Finally, in order to tackle the problematic diplomatic relationship between Pakistan 
and India, policy-makers must understand that nuclear weapons are not the 
cause but one of the symptoms of the latent instability between both countries. 
Accordingly, basing any bilateral negotiations on the core issues behind the Paki-
stan-India animosity, instead of focusing solely on the nuclear weapons, could have 
a positive spillover effect and possibly allow for a decrease of the nuclear threat in 
South Asia.
Finally, the stabilization of the trilateral nuclear dynamics in South Asia requires 
not only the involvement of China, India and Pakistan but also of other countries 
that, albeit not directly involved, still directly exert a strong influence in this 
dynamic, namely the US. Failing to do so will only perpetuate the South Asian 
nuclear “action-reaction” cycle and exacerbate the threats that undermine the 
fragile regional stability.
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